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The Interest of Reason in a World in Evolution
INTRODUCTION: THE CHARACTER OF REASON IN ITS EVOLUTIONARY ORIGIN
With the presentation of Professor Manuel Curado the question on the origin
and the nature of reason hás been placed in an evolutionary framework. This
means that the question 'why is there reason?' should be answered by reconstructing
the stages of the evolutionary process. Only in this way we can get to know the
causes (previous physical and biological states) which produced the emergence
of reason. Moreover, the question 'what is the nature of reason and how does it
work?' is also the result of an evolutionary study of its origin. We could say that
our knowledge of the ontology of reason depends on our knowledge of how it hás
emerged in the evolutionary process. The same is true of its functions: they depend
on reason's ontology and on its adaptive function in order to survive as an
instrument of evolution in an objective world.
Curado's presentation also offers a special contribution that could be described
broadly as the connection between evolution and epistemology. That is, the
characteristics of the idea of knowledge accessible by epistemology (that is to
say, the discipline that studies our phenomenological experience of knowledge)
are explained in the evolutionary context. Reason (described by its characteristics,
such as locality, logical depth, intersubjectivity...) is like it is because of the
interest of evolution: the interest of reason is the interest of evolution. This
evolutionary origin explains both the shortcomings and weaknesses of reason
and the necessary adaptation to an objective world that necessarily imposes its
computational constraints. Therefore, ali rationality built from within the world
rnust respond to necessary objective constraints that underlie the laws of nature.
But at the same time, reason is weak and full of contradictions, walking on the
temporary, though history would try to reflect the objective rationality. Manuel
Curado tries to show that reason balances between its desire to reflect the objective
necessity of computational constraints (in accordance with Minsky's way of
thinking) and its weak products, their shortcomings, their «rational constructs»,
that are perhaps only a possible way to express the objective rationality.
It is important to put this session into the context of the Seminar's discourse:
a) In relation to the contribution of Roberto Poli, Curado extends and
complements Poli's point of view. The logic of life (Poli) is the same logic
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of evolution (Curado). Life hás become an adaptive systems analysis that
explains why reason functions as «systems analysis». Therefore life and
reason are «anticipatory systems». When Curado speaks of the logic of
evolution, he integrates the logic of life that is built on the intervention
of Roberto Poli. Curado explains why evolutionary logic (the logic of life)
produces epistemological properties of knowledge. Poli focuses on systems
analysis and anticipatory systems. Curado extends the evolutionary origin
of reason to epistemological characteristics such as location, logical depth
and intersubjectivity. The interest of the evolutionary reason for their
utility is conditioned by these characteristics dictated by the same
evolutionary origin.
b) In relation to the contribution of Walach, it complements and extends
Curado's position. Reason is an adaptive tool that hás been shaped during
the evolutionary process in the light of experience of the objective world.
This experience is part of a systemic and structural world that makes
reason (as well as life) an adaptive system to a world of systems (Poli)
and, as Curado says, of «computational constraints». But not only that.
Reason is also a product of the experience of a holistic world, what
produces in the mind the adequate rationality to represent the knowledge
of that world (Walach). Therefore, Walach proposed a psychological
experience (and hence an explanation of reason) conceived within a
complementarity principie: firstly, as it is in physics, the classical
mechanics and, secondly, the quantum mechanics. In this Une should
be placed Javier Monserrat's comment to the ideas of Curado, as they
attempt to relate the contribution of Curado to the framework of the
previous two sessions.
c) In relation to the contribution of Gregor Nickel, Curado defends the
evolutionary origin of reason. Formal systems that have been constructed
by the human mind arise from the experience of a world of structures with
objective necessity. However, Curado does not know why mathematics
can be applied to the objective world. We know that its models are useful
só far, but we have no absolute assurance. Curado also attributes insecurity,
weakness and other shortcomings to the formal sciences, shortcomings
which belong generally t-o knowledge because of its precarious evolutionary
origin. Up to now we have got these formal systems, but we could imagine
other ones that might be more useful for understanding certain aspects of
reality. In the discussion of the second session it was raised the possibility
that our experience of an indeterministic and holistic world would require
new formal systems, not yet designed by the human mind.
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THE INTEREST OF REASON IN A WORLD IN EVOLUTION
MANUEL CURADO
University of Minho, Portugal [curado.manuel@gmail.com]
L CONTRADICTORY TERMS?
Rationality hás emerged in an evolutionary world. This sentence by itse
seems to be a blunt contradiction. Saying this more clearly, the word 'rationalit
doesn't fit the word 'evolution'. It's not difficult to understand why this seen
such a big evidence for many persons. Evolution depends on the casual, c
random processes and on time. The structure that we see around us derive
from processes that could have not happened. The number of these process*
is huge and they seem to encompass the history of evolution.
Ali this doesn't fit our common understanding of rationality. The mo
important logical structures, like the logic principies, do not seem to have ti
possibility of being different. The impression of evidence they impart on us
só strong that is very difficult to imagine that they derived from random processe
More than this, indeed: rationality is a mental modality that claims the truth <
its statements about the objects of the world. A true statement is a small wor
where there is an absolute order. The truth of a true statement evades time ar
circumstance. As ali this is not enough, rationality hás a normativity that allov
for the imagination of possible scenarios completely different from what we fir
around us. These small set of characteristics of rationality do not fit our wor
in evolution.
This is a fascinating problem. We are in need of an explanation of the seemir
abnormality of rationality among the structures and properties of human min
Many other difficult problems are pale in comparison with this one. One es
think about the momentous philosophical problem of the relation betwee
subjective experience and biological brains. To know why we feel what we fé
instead of feeling nothing, as we were automata, is a problem that was proper
labeled as the hard problem of consciousness. However, compared with ti
explanation of the emergence of rationality in an evolutionary world, the hai
problem of consciousness seems surprisingly simple.
Let's see with more detail some aspects of the problem we're dealing with
get a big picture of the issue. Rationality is a characteristic of human beings. í
far as one could do a list of traces that are common to ali the peoples of ti
earth, a list we could label as the list of human universais, one couldn't avo:
noticing rationality. Let's take as an example of this the famous list of hurm
universais putted forward by Donald E. Brown and published in 1991.
Brown hás selected the traces like the abstraction in speech and thought; ti
fact that ali persons in the world do use classification schemes of age, behavior
propensities, body parts, colors, fauna, flora, inner states, kin, sex, space, too]
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weather conditions and many, many other subjects; conjecturai reasoning;
distinguishing right and wrong; entification or treating patterns and relations as
things; figurative speech; interpreting behavior; language (employed to manipulate
others, employed to misinform or mislead, translation, language as not a simple
reflection of reality, prestige from proficient use of language); numerais and
counting systems; semantics (category of affecting things and people, dimension,
giving, location, motion, speed, semantic components related to generation and
sex); symbolic speech; etc.'.
This small sample (sic) of the big list of Brown's human universais is very
impressive. Ali the peoples of the Earth do have rationality. Thinking in possible
worlds, no one knows human persons without rationality or with completely
different structures of rationality. This is, precisely, the philosophical problem
we're dealing with. How did those structures emerge? Could they have been very
different or there is something that prevenis the human mind of being otherwise?
Let's try to find the common elements to ali these rational structures. Given
the diversity of those structures, this is not an easy task. However, we're going
to detain ourselves in a few main characteristics. Three traces are especially
conspicuous.
The special beings that do own those structures - ourselves - do not duplicate
the world with perfect mirrors, true representations or accurate pristine maps.
Rationality is not a perfect mirror of nature. It's selective, biased and, obviously,
is much more simple than the whole of nature itself. Using images to state this
more intuitively: human mind is a small world, a compressed world. The highest
point and, probably, the most perfect trace of rationality shows this very precisely.
Science tries to uncover the laws of nature with compressed algorithms of millions
of information units. From data that is the result of millions of observations
about the whereabouts of the planets, for instance, a physical law is abstracted.
This law is simpler than the observational data and hás an algorithmic
formulation that states with elegance the planetary movement. With a well-
formed law we can reconstruct the precise position of the planets and unfold
the observational data. Kepler and Newton, among many others, have showed
us how to do só.
What we do have in science we do also have ali the time in the human mind.
Our categories and classification schemes are very different but they do have
this in common: they simplify the world. Human values are very different, but
they also have this in common: they simplify the world. Period.
We know that not ali natural processes can be algorithmically compressed.
One can think, for instance, in chaotic systems. In order to understand those
systems, one must go along their unfolding until the very end. We cannot
simplify our observational data in an elegant formula. Nature hás not granted
1 See BROWN, DONALD E., «Human universal», in WILSON, R. A. - KEIL, F. C. (eds.), The MIT
Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science (Cambridge MA, The MIT Press, 1999), pp. 382-384; and
PINKER, STEVEN, The Blank Slate: The Modem Denial of Human Nature (New York, Viking, 2002),
pp. 435-439.
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us structures to understand directly this kind of natural systems because - this
is a conjecture - that would imply very expensive computational and cognitive
resources.
Is it possible that in the vast and enigmatic world of ours there are many
other kinds of systems beyond the classic and the chaotic. As far as we know,
nature hás not equipped us for us to easily pay attention to them and understand
their behavior and properties.
Going back to Brown's list, a trace that seems common to ali those structures
is the fact that they are regional. Saying this otherwise, human mind hás the
obvious property of locality. In order for us to know something, we don't need
to know everything in the universe. The way we know something is always local
and regional; one could also say, atomic. Of course, one could imagine beings
that would need to know everything in order to know something. Hypothetical
beings like these could inhabit simpler worlds than ours, worlds without the
huge complexity we see around us. In these simpler worlds, to know something
would imply to know everything.
Let's state this without ambiguity: the structure of human rationality is
connected with the degree of complexity of the world itself. Using a category
that belongs to physics and to the complexity sciences, one could say that our
world hás depth, logical depth. The world had to take many steps to go from the
beginning until the levei of organization we see around us. If we consider the
world as a computational system, this current levei of organization would imply
time, huge amounts of time, many steps in the between and the progressive
abandon of simpler leveis.
There's an annoying question about Brown's list of human universais: the
reason why our minds have such a big logical depth. Well, things could have
been otherwise; we could have had simpler minds. As a matter of fact, as far as
we know, animais do have simpler minds. Of course we could also have much
more complex minds than ours. For instance, we could have minds without
logical paradoxes, minds speedier that our fastest computers, minds without
intromission of emotions or bias. Our imagination is the only limit when one
considers possible mental structures.
This degree of logical depth of human rationality and of the brain that supports
it is an important element for our reflection. It gives us a time reference: the
depth of rational human structures could not possibly have arisen randomly in
the world. It gives us also a parallel with the levei of organization we see in nature
around us. There are no obvious discrepancies; we do have rationality with a
precise levei of logical depth and we live in a kind of world with a parallel levei
of logical depth. Finally, we are before a very interesting counterfactual scenario:
human rationality could be much simpler and also much more complex than it
actually is, and our world could also be much simpler and much more complex
than it currently is.
Let's return to our initial problem: How can we explain the emergence of
rationality in a world in evolution? What must we precisely explain? These aspects
PENSAMIENTO, vol. 66 (2010), num. 249pp.511-543
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seem to me the most relevant: algorithmic compression, locality of our knowledge
and the degree of logical depth. Is this enough?
These characteristics could exist even if evolution hás allowed for the
existence of a unique rational being in some places in the universe. This
is clearly a very imaginative scenario because we don't have the faintest hint
that that hás happened in some other place in the universe. The evolutionary
process that unfolded on Earth hás not just one single agent; on the contrary,
rationality is disseminated over ali agents there are, especially the most basic
aspects of it.
Let's add, then, a fourth property to the already mentioned three. This property
could be labeled, in the absence of a better name, the multiplicity of rational
agents.
II. THE RED BUTTON
Let's try to describe this rational multiplicity in a more intuitive way. The
very fact that rationality is present in a multiple agent scenario helps us to
understand its ultimate value. When we mentioned algorithmic compression,
locality and logical depth we were very close to an anthropic perspective, the
idea that the universe hás unfolded itself in such a way that it allowed the
emergence of rational observers. This nice idea cannot be proved because it hás
a teleological bias that is dissonant with everything else we know about the rest
of evolution. It's important to refuse any intromission of the anthropic principie
in this debate. The teleological approach overstates the most perfect aspects of
rationality. On the contrary, the multiplicity of rational beings shows us
imperfection, impotence and incompletude. Rationality is not only the most
beautiful collection of mankind's highest achievements; it's also the problematic
collection of permanent underachievements and very humiliating ones.
There are many ways to show that human rationality is imperfect. Ever since
the ancient Greeks the list of imperfections is very long. One recalls famous tales
about paradoxes, the famous arguments about akrasia or weakness of the will,
and the also famous denunciations of the role of emotions in the rational life.
More recently, with the debate around what can and cannot be proved inside
each formal system, we have continued the description of rationality's own limits.
Ali this is very well documented.
It's important to draw our attention to the limits of rationality derived from
contextuai aspects. What does this mean? If one considers rationality as part of
human nature in evolution, one should have an instrumental notion of its eff ective
value in helping beings that live in community. It's not correct to imagine a lone
being making perfect sequential calculations. Human rationality in action doesn't
function that way. To get a notion of what we're dealing with, a really limited
structure is a precious result. Everything concerned with rationality creates the
strong illusion that reason hás no imperfection or limit. Logical principies,
schemes of classification, intersubjectivity, normativity, the claim for true and
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non subjective statements and the capacity to refer to objects outside human
beings work in unison to create an impression that the wonderful building of
rationality hás no cracks, no imperfections.
Let's think for a moment in one possible variation of the wolf s dilemma
described a few years ago by the cognitive scientist Douglas Hofstadter2. Ill call
this variation the red button dilemma. I'll try to amplify Hofstadter's original
dilemma.
Let's imagine that there is a red button inside a room. Some big buildings do
have fifty rooms. Ali fifty rooms have a red button. We choose randomly in the
street fifty persons that do not know each other and that are completely unable
to see or communicate with each other. Well tell each one of the fifty persons
the following: «if you want to win one thousand euros, you just have to stay
inside one room during ten minute and not press the red button. If one of the
other forty nine persons do press the red button for whatever reason, that person
solo will get one hundred euros and nobody else will get any money».
The rules of this experience are very clear and ali of us do understand what
is implied in this situation. Allow me an interpretation. This experience is a
perfect portrait of our world: it hás many persons; persons are different from
each other; some are clever, others not só; some are young, others less young,
etc. If we were the inhabitants of an intelligent and exclusively rational world,
ali the fifty persons would let the ten minutes pass and would get each one one
thousand euros. However, in this world of ours that is not what happens.
Because we are different from each other and we don't know for sure what's
going on in other persons' minds, our experience shows that there is a strong
temptation for someone to press immediately the red button. In our world the
rule is this one: the smarteryou are, the dumbestyou decide. The more intelligent
persons are precisely those than understand in the first place that they should
press the red button as soon as possible.
For one to understand that there is no way to win this red button situation,
one could do some improvements of our original random selection of persons.
Let's suppose that in one of the rooms we put someone extraordinarily intelligent,
let's say, a Nobel Laureate in Physics or Medicine, whatever. There's no doubt
whatsoever about the outcome: that person, precisely because he's very intelligent,
would be the first one to press the red button. That clever person would do the
less clever thing possible.
And what would happen if in one of those fifty rooms there were one hundred
geniuses with Nobel prizes and Fields medals? With ali probability, that room
would press the button in the first place.
We were educated with the conviction that there are always authorities that
can help us to understand difficult issues: ministers, priests, rabbis,
psychoanalysts, politicians, judges, scientists, king philosophers... Well, we can
choose our favorite King Solomon as a model of wisdom. But we must remember
2 HOFSTADTER, DOUGLAS, Metamagical Themes (New York, Basic Books, 1985), pp. 752-53.
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this: even if we put our most wise King Solomon in one of the fifty rooms, he
won't decide better than we do. This is incredible! We live in a world where wisdom
is irrelevant in many situations.
Most of the times we don't have a precise notion of what rationality is worth
of because, for reasons connected with our intellectual history, we tend to imagine
that each of us lives alone in the world as the Little Prince of Saint-Exupéry. We
think rationality in the scenario of single agents and not in the scenario of multiple
agents.
The red button dilemma shows us the fundamental frailty of rationality. The
very nature of this frailty in contextuai: it depends on the number of the persons
involved, on communication and on the impossibility of communication to
access other persons' point of view.
A very interesting aspect of this frailty is quantitative. Notice this: the rational
capacity of the person inside one of the fifty rooms doesn't help her or him to
solve the problem, even if that person were preternaturally superior or smarter.
Can we generalize this feature? I think we can. Those big rational capacities
seem to be useless in our world. Being fair for those hypothetical smarter persons,
we could say that those persons do understand many important things: they
categorize correctly the objects, they differentiate their own persons from the
objects that stand around them, they do understand the general features and
rules of the situation they're inside of, and they do have rational preferences
(they prefer to get more to get less, they prefer to get something to get nothing,
they prefer this brand of beer to other brands, etc.).
How can we understand this awkward situation?
Let us notice in the first place that the persons inside the rooms do have a
rationality that can be described with the properties we mentioned before. It's
obvious that the way those persons think is algorithmically compressed; they
select sequentially aspects of the situation according to what they consider to
be relevant; the color of the walls is not relevant, só nobody mentions it and that
feature stays out and unmentioned.
It's also obvious that reasoning is local. In order to find out what to do during
the ten minutes is not necessary to take into consideration, for instance, the
history of Europe since the Roman Empire. The choice one must take is local;
what is relevant is local; and the rational process only takes into account the
small world of the situation.
Finally, it's important to notice that rational activity of these persons shows
the logical depth of the situation. It would be very improbable that the history
of the universe had started with a scenario like the red button dilemma and not
with something apparently simpler like the Big Bang. As a matter of fact, one
of the handicaps that persons deal with is the lack of previous information about
the other forty nine persons involved. What is that person in need of from the
point of view of logical depth? Clearly, he misses information about previous
states of the system, namely biographical information about the other persons
involved.
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These three properties are ali present but do not help much in a situat;
where there are many rational beings. Any of these properties would be perf
if the world had just one person or agent. Human beings are not like that.
We have, then, a very unsatisfactory result that gives us a quantitative pó
of view about what's our rationality is worth of.
The failure of each of those persons isn't total. Each of them does understs
the situation and the utter impossibility of doing any better. Those persons sta
then, in the very middle of a scale: neither are they completely stupid r
completely intelligent. They are in the middle of a scale; likewise they are in
middle of the scale of algorithmic compression, in the middle of the scale
locality and in the middle of the scale of logical depth.
It's possible, then, to interpret positively the limits the red button dilem
shows us. These limitations denounce the computational geography of our woi
Please notice the following scenarios:
Scenario Number One. We could have been a kind of beings with just c
type of subjective sensations (for instance, the content of the taste of coff
or the content of smelling vanilla ice-cream). Fortunately, we have more th
one type but we fali short of an astronomical number of types of subject
experiences; it seems than we have precisely the correct number: not too sm
not too big.
Scenario Number Two. It's a remote possibility that ali of us could be beii
that speak just a single language; or, at the other side of the spectrum
possibilities, each one of us could speak a private language unknown to otl
persons. As f ar as we know, there were at least seventy billions persons on t
planet, and we could have spoken precisely than number of languages, e£
person with his or her own language. As we know, there are more or less j
six thousand human languages on Earth. One more time, our predicament i
situation where we have neither too little, nor too much; we are always in 1
middle of a scale of possibilities about human languages.
Scenario Number Three. Please do notice that we can describe this point a
universal rule of translation. If we have languages too poor lexically, it's harc
find terms to refer objects common to two languages. In order to get a gc
translation, one must work with languages with rich vocabulary. If the logic
this argument is correct, translation demands languages with increasingly hig]
numbers of terms of vocabulary. The translation, say, between Basic Engl
and Basic Portuguese is not satisfactory. However, if the total number
vocabulary terms of English would amount to billions, the rational resources
a translator would not be enough to check the whole vocabulary set trying
find the precise match for a translation of a precise word. The return would
shorter than the investment or even inexistent. For one to get a proper translati
one needs a lexical set neither too small, nor too big.
Scenarios Number Fourand Five. The computational constraints that the ]
button dilemma and translation tasks show us are present in many other domai
The list is overwhelming. Think, for instance, in the sensorial stimulati
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according to the nineteenth-century Weber-Fechner's law, and in economic
situations where the law of diminishing returns applies.
We have here computational constraints that describe precisely the rational
limits of the persons that stand inside the fifty rooms of our dilemma. The
multiplicity of rational agents is, therefore, an important characteristic to
understand the origin of rationality. It localizes rationality inside the computational
geography of our world and shows us that we are not trying to understand a
private matter, or a subjective matter, or even a human matter. We're trying to
grasp the very computational geography of the world, with rational human beings
or with finite rational beings that could exist somewhere else in the universe, as
Kant could have said.
III. Is RATIONALITY AN EXCLUSIVELY HUMAN TRACE?
We have right no w a strong suspicion. It's this one: what rationality seems
to show does not match its effective results. We have no way to decide correctly
in a world that is properly represented by the red button dilemma. We can fill
in a vast list of instances of reason's shortcomings: we have no general problem
solver, no universal translation algorithm, no idea of how to solve the problem
of reference, human creativity is the source of everything we dêem precious but
we cannot understand the logical structure of creativity itself. I stop at this point
because the list of reason's shortcomings is indeed very long, and probably is
endless. We can, obviously, make a parallel with the greatest hits of rationality,
and it would be good to do that in order to get a balanced perspective of the
whole issue.
Human rationality hás a difference of degree but not of kind in relation to
the rationality of other species. During the nineteenth-century, Darwin provided
us with the will to understand how characteristics that seem to belong exclusively
to humans are in simpler forms in other animais, namely language, subjective
consciousness, mating and courtship, and, of course, rationality.
The agenda that tries to naturalize reason had with Darwin one of its highest
points. In The Descent ofMan, Darwin wrote these truly amazing words: «Of ali
the faculties of the human mind, it will, I presume, be admitted that Reason
stands at the summit. Only a few persons now dispute that animais possess some
power of reasoning. Animais may constantly be seen to pause, deliberate, and
resolve. It is a significant fact, that the more the habits of any particular animal
are studied by a naturalist, the more he attributes to reason and the less to
unlearnt instincts»3.
This agenda hás been só successful that we now are trying to find the
evolutionary origins of human rationality. The studies with unicellular and
simple beings are, perhaps, the most impressive to start with. One recalls the
studies about the calculation skills of fungi, about the intelligence of swarms
3 DARWIN, C., The Descent of Man (1871), p. 75.
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and about the phenomenon of quorum sensing that was discovered by the
biologist Bonnie Bassler of the University of Princeton4. It's useless to dare to
mention many studies about other superior animais, like simians.
How can we understand these amazing results? Well, in the first place, in the
evolutionary series we belong to human beings share rationality with other
beings. The philosopher Max Black hás described this situation in a celebrated
article with the title «Why Should I Be Rational?» as the minimum rationality
or compressed reasoning that is present in both humans and the other animais5.
The structure of common uses of reasoning includes interpretation of perceptive
signals, the fitness of behavior to situations and the anticipation of future events.
Notwithstanding this result, there is another one much more impressive. For
many centuries there have been philosophical theories that state that reason
cannot be naturalized. We're living in an extraordinary epoch in which we do
have the intellectual resources to look at this question with confidence. Now we
can state, against the American philosopher Hilary Putnam and many others;
that reason can indeed be naturalized6. We're learning nowadays the corred
way of doing this.
IV. HYPOTHETICAL AND FINITE RATIONAL BEINGS
Let's assess what we have right now. In the first place, we have this justifiec
belief that rationality in not a lone and remarkable exception of the human mind
and that, therefore, it's also present in other living beings.
The question we must ask is whether rationality, as we know it (magnificen
but strangely incomplete in human beings, at a minimum levei but very robus
in animais), is an accident in the evolutionary history of Earth or an inevitabilit<
in the universe.
Please notice that this question is not as exaggerated as it seems. The law:
of nature that science hás already discovered show a universe that can b«
understood, or partially understood, with laws that abstract an algorithmicall;
compressed statement from the complexity of the world; a universe characterize<
4 About calculating fungi, see NAKAGAKI, TOSHIYUKI - YAMADA, HIROYASU, «Maze-solving b
an amoeboid organism», Nature, 407 (28 September 2000), p. 470. About quorum sensing, se
BASSLER, BONNIE L., «Tiny conspiracies», Natural History, 110: 4 (2001), pp. 16-22; STRAUS:
EVELYN, «A symphony of bacterial voices», Science, 284 (05/21/99), pp. 1302-1305; and BEI<
JACOB, ESHEL, et ai, «Cooperativa self-organization in microorganisms», Advances in Physia
49 (2000), pp. 395-555.
5 BLACK, MAX, «Why Should I Be Rational?», Dialéctica, 36: 2-3 (1982), pp. 147-168. Se
also DAVIDSON, DONALD, «Rational Animais», Dialéctica, 36: 4 (1982), pp. 317-327.
6 The case in favor of the idea that reason cannot be naturalized can be found in PUTNAM
HILARY, «Why reason can't be naturalized», in Realism and Reason. Philosophical Papers, vol.
(New York, Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 229-247. Recent studies about the cognith
and societal structures of rationality are summarized in Leda Cosmides' article «The logic (
social exchange: Hás natural selection shaped how humans reason? Studies with the Wasc
selection task», Cognition, 31 (1989), pp. 187-276.
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by logical depth; and a universe that seems local (what happens in one place
doesn't propagate to the entire universe).
There's no doubt that we're stepping on a very demanding ground. If we
enlarge this search for signals of rationality to hypothetical beings outside
Earth, we'11 be in serious problems. No one in the scientific community knows
those beings or whether they are possible at ali. This imaginative exercise is
purely methodological. Trying to imagine those hypothetical beings is a way
to try to understand human beings' rational constraints. Kant's concept of
potential finite rational beings is an important philosophical precedent. Many
Kantian arguments try to find a truth that imposes itself on human rationality
and on the rationality of sundries rational finite beings that there may exist
somewhere else.
The very existence of difference is a fact of life. We don't need other beings
for that. It's possible, not only to imagine sentient beings with other phenomenic
content or with other perceptive modalities; it's possible, say, to find real human
beings with damage done to their perceptive or mental faculties.
However, differently from other structures of human mind, rationality doesn't
seem to be able to be otherwise. Human rationality is a blend of computational
constraints and evolutionary situations. The argument here presented contends
that this blend is common to other aspects of human mind as well, namely
language, subjective experiences, and many others.
Let's pay attention to this incapacity ofbeing otherwise7. A few years ago the
MIT computer scientist Marvin Minsky described a delightful possible
communicative situation with alien rational beings8. Minsky's question was this
one: Is it possible to communicate with hypothetical alien beings with higher
intelligence, or, at least, with intelligence very different from our own human
type of intelligence?
This question about the possibility of communication with hypothetical aliens
is really an enquiry about the ultimate nature of rationality of human beings.
Minsky places rationality in the right context, the evolutionary nature.
The result he obtains is very interesting: the possibility of variation of the
most basic structures of rationality is very narrow, as if human beings, other
biological beings and even hypothetical aliens were limited by common
computational constraints. From a philosophical point of view, this result is
correct because it draws very heavily from two important sources: evolution
theory and computational constraints.
There are other ways of exploring this incapacity of being otherwise. The Brazilian
logician Newton Da Costa explored the possibility of other rational structures in human
societies; see DA COSTA, NEWTON - BUENO, OTÁVIO - FRENCH, STEVEN, «Is there a Zande logic?»,
History and Philosophy of Logic, 19 (1998), pp. 41-54; and TRIPPLETT, TIMM, «Azande logic versus
Western logic?», British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 39 (1988), pp. 361-366.
8 MINSKY, MARVIN, «Why intelligent aliens will be intelligible», in REGIS, EDWARD, JR. (ed.),
Extraterrestrials: Science and Alien Intelligence (New York, Cambridge University Press 1985)'
pp. 117-128.
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As a matter of fact, Minsky is not interested in aliens or in animais or, even,
in human beings. The category that is common to ali these kinds of beings is
«general problem solver». From this point of view, «ali problem-solvers, intelligent
or not, are subject to the same ultimate constraints - limitations on space, time,
and materiais». Finding a way to cope with these constraints implies finding a
way to represent situations and processes to manipulate those representations.
What is impressive in Minsky's paper is the powerful idea that evolution fmds
necessarily certain common ideas because, putting this in a straightforward
manner, there are no easier ways available.
The main ingredients of intelligence, that hypothetical aliens must also use,
are the objectives, and sub-objectives, goals, and sub-goals, cause-symbols,
memories, economics, planning, self-reference or self-awareness, and just a few
others.
The very core of this theory is the notion that the emergence of rational
structures was inevitable. 'To evolve' means in this context to search inside a
universe of possible structures. Now we can answer a very old question about
the amazing human capacity to understand the world humans inhabit. And the
answer to this question is that rationality in not an abnormality in the evolutionary
world but shares with evolution common principies of economics, sparseness
and computation. Saying this more to the point: computational constraints are
common to nature and to thought. Rationality is not, therefore, an evolutionary
accident alongside many, many others, in spite of the fact that evolution as a
whole is an astronomically big collection of random events and accidents. These
accidents occur only in the small details because the overall logic of evolution
imposes itself on ali processes.
There are, of course, a few problems with this Minskys theory. The first one
is, obviously, the conviction that the human brain in a universal Turing machine.
Nobody is sure about this point, and it's possible that the most interesting rational
processes, like creativity in general and mathematical creativity in particular,
or the ability to feel subjective experiences, cannot be described according to
the notion of Turing machine.
Another difficult point concerns the supposition that ali parts of reality
organize themselves with computational processes. For instance, nobody is sure
about this point in what concerns the microphysical realms. (For the sake of the
argument, we can emphasize that biological evolution happens on complexity
leveis very different forni the complexity levei of microphysics.)
In spite of being a truly remarkable theory, the ideas advanced by Minsky
have many limitations. However, it must be said that it's a powerful tool to
understand the most difficult aspect of rationality. As we said before, rationality
is a rather special part of the human mind. Its amazing ability to produce true
statements about reality frees itself from the orbit of subjectivity.
In this sense, an explanation about the origins of rationality demands ar
enquiry about the very essence of that surprise that many philosophers, 01
scientists with philosophical minds, expressed when they noticed the eerie ability
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of rational thought to represent nature. One thinks, among others, in the famous
essay about «the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural
sciences» written by the physicist Eugene Wigner; or the mathematician R. W.
Hamming's essay about «The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics»9.
This is, indeed, a huge problem. If the human mind were exclusively subjective,
one could say that we are beings interested only in our own issues, in our own
interests. However, precisely because reason seems to have a structure amazingly
homologous to the computational structure of our world, it's possible that human
reason hás an interest of its own.
This reason's own or selfish interest may or may not be identical with the
overall human interest. This is a very rare suspicion because we tend to identify
ourselves with the representation reason hás made for us. We don't trust the
interests of other parts and structures of the human beings; we don't trust, for
instance, our craving for sweets; we don't trust the feeling of jealousy; we don't
trust our own will when it is under temptation; we don't trust the ability of the
human brain to solve problems without solution with thousands of years; we
don't trust common perceptive illusions; sometimes, we don't even trust the
strength of our faith; we don't trust caprice, childlike caprice or feminine caprice,
for instance; we don't trust hitches; the list is indeed very long. Só, why should
we trust our own reason? It's a good question, isn't it?
V. A CONJECTURE
Let's finish this paper with a very imaginative conjecture. Without any
ambiguity, is important to state clearly that there is no way of proving it. As
a consequence, one can feel free to interpret it as a literary or philosophical
suggestion. The conjecture is the following. Step Number One. Human
rationality hás a structure homologous to the computational structure of reality;
we can verify this with a few concepts derived from Physics or from the Sciences
of Complexity, namely, algorithmic compression, locality, logical depth, and
Turing machine properties, or with the biological concept of Darwinian
evolution.
Step Number Two. Human rationality seems to be an unfinished building,
because it offers us both true statements about reality and a cohort of paradoxes
and constitutive problems.
See WIGNER, EUGENE P., «The unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural
sciences», in Symmetries and Reflections (Woodbridge CT, Ox Bow Press, 1979), pp. 222-237;
and HAMMING, R. W., «The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics», The American
Mathematical Monthly, 87: 2 (February 1980), p. 81. See also DAVIES, P. C. W., «Why is the
Physical World só Comprehensible?», in ZUREK, WOJCIECH H. (ed.), Complexity, Entropy, and
the Physics of Information (Reading MA: Perseus Books, 1990), pp. 61-70; and OMNÈS, ROLAND,
Converging Realities: Toward a Common Philosophy of Physics and Mathematics (Princeton N3,
Princeton University Press, 2005).
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Step Number Three. We know that rationality emerged in a precise evolutionary
sequence we call 'our universe', and, as far as we can see, is part of the observable
universe because this universe can be explained using rational natural laws.
Step Number Four. It's possible that rationality seems unfinished to us because
we don't have yet the big picture of the universe; taking notice of the physical
theories of the Swedish physicist Max Tegmark and other Many Worlds
Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics, it may happen that our world is not part
of a universe but part of a multiverse where ali conceivable possibilities do indeed
exist10. From this point of view, the rationality we own as a tool or as the true
picture of our face (pick the possibility you prefer, 111 keep the first one, rationality
as a tool) is just a regional characteristic of an evolutionary sequence; many
other types of rationality could exist in many other universes of Tegmark's
multiverse.
I hope this conjecture turns out to be true.
II. SESSION PROCEEDINGS
PRESENTATION
After a brief presentation of the Sophia Ibéria Project and its First Academic
Seminar by Christine Heller, who acted as moderator of the first part of this
session, Prof. Curado began his presentation:
Contradictory terms
Human beings and ali natural things that surround us have developed by
evolution, depending on a huge number of random processes which could have
not occurred. On the other hand, rationality is ruled by logical principies which
do not seem to have the possibility of being any different. This contradiction
makes it a hard problem to explain the emergence of rationality in an evolutionary
world.
Rationality is one of the universal human characteristics (a list made by
Donald E. Brown in 1991 " was partially read). Curado highlights the following
common elements among the rational structures of the different peoples on
Earth: l. Rationality does not duplicate the world, but acts selectively, in a biased
and simplifying manner. As we see especially with science, rationality tries to
find an algorithmically compressed way to duplicate most natural processes.
2. Locality is another common characteristic to our rational structures, that is
10 A bright and funny introduction to Tegmark's ideas can be found in CHOWN, MARCUS,
The Universe Next Door (London, Headline Book Publishing/Review, 2003).
11 See BROWN, DONALD E., «Human universal», in WILSON, R. A. - KEIL, F. C. (eds.), The MIT
Encyclopaedia ofCognitive Science (Cambridge MA, The MIT Press, 1999), pp. 382-384.
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to say, in order for us to know something we don't need to know everything in
the universe. 3. Human rationality hás a high degree of logical depth. The world
we live in hás a parallel levei of logical depth. 4. It is also important to take into
account the multiplicity of rational beings.
The red button
Prof. Curado refuses to consider the teleological argument usually called the
anthropic principie, because in his opinion it is dissonant with everything we
know about evolution and because this approach overstates the most perfect
aspects of rationality. He also wants to take into account the imperfection,
impotence and incompleteness corning from the multiplicity of rational beings
and, without forgetting rationality's highest achievements, the many humiliating
shortcomings of its use by mankind.
The imperfections of human rationality have been shown since old times in
famous paradoxes, and the bad influence of our emotions and our weak will in
our minds have also been always deplored. Some of its limits have been confirmed
in more recent studies about what can and cannot be proved within formal
systems. Other limits derive from contextuai aspects. In order to describe them
in a more intuitive way, Prof. Curado presented the red button dilemma (a
variation of Douglas Hofstadter's wolfs dilemma)12 to the audience.
We have fifty rooms with a red button in each one of them. Fifty people,
chosen randomly, are put in these rooms unable to communicate with each
other. They are told that if none of them presses his/her button in ten minutes,
everybody will be given one thousand euros per person, but if one of them presses
his/her button and nobody else does, that person alone will receive one hundred
euros, and the rest will receive nothing. The rational thing to do would be that
everybody waits ten minutes without pressing any of the buttons, but that is not
what happens. Usually there are some people (the smarter ones) who try to press
the button as soon as possible, because they don't know for sure what's going
on in the others' minds. In Curado's opinion that would be in agreement to a
common rule in our world: the smarter you are, the dumber you decide. In fact,
we live in a world where wisdom is irrelevant in many situations.
We usually think rationality in the scenario of a single agent and not of
multiple agents. In the red button dilemma we discover a contextuai limitation
of rationality: the number of persons involved and the impossibility of
communication among them causes a deficiency in the rationality of the decisions
taken. The contextuai difficulty makes it irrelevant if the individuais are very
intelligent or not. This result makes us realize why big rational capacities seem
to be useless in our world. Even if their rationality works flawlessly, with is
typical characteristics of algorithmic compression, locality and logical depth,
these three properties are not of much help because the missing information
12 HOFSTADTER, DOUGLAS, MetamcLgical Themes (New York, Basic Books, 1985), pp. 752-53.
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about the other persons is decisive when multiple rational beings are involve
Those properties would be perfect if the world had just one rational agent, b
that's not the case.
The fifty people involved are able to use the characteristics of rationality
a middle scale, thus the red button dilemma shows us limitations that denoun
the computational geography of our world, that is to say, situations where >
are at best when the possibilities are not too many nor too less. Prof. Curai
then explored a few possible scenarios concluding the following: l. We have t
correct number of subjective sensations, not too small, not too big. 2. There
a good number of languages in the world, not just one for everybody nor (wl
would be a nightmare) one different language per person. 3. For a good translati
it is better to work with languages that have rich vocabularies, but not enormou
big. 4. These computational restraints are present in many other domains, su
as sensorial stimulation and economic situations. He finally concluded that t
multiplicity of rational agents is an important characteristic to understand 1
origin of rationality.
/s rationality an axclusively human trace?
Our rationality is able of great achievements and also hás import;
shortcomings. In other animal species we find a different degree of rationa
but not a difference in kind. Scientists since Darwin have discovered numen
animal behaviours that can be attributed to reason. And só, we now are try
to find the evolutionary origins of reason. The structure of common uses
reasoning includes interpretation of perceptive signals, fitness of behavioi
situations and anticipation of future events.
Hypothetical and finite rational beings
Rationality, as we know it, is present not only in humans (magnificent
strangely incomplete) but also in other living beings (at a lower levei). ".
question is if this rationality is an accident in the evolutionary history of Ec
or an inevitability in the universe. This latter possibility is well supported by
fact that science hás discovered a universe that can be (at least partia
understood with algorithmically compressed laws, a universe characterizec
logical depth and that seems to be local (what happens in one place doe
propagate to the entire universe).
Prof. Curado considered then, as a methodological exercise in orde
understand rationality's constraints, the imagination of hypothetical ratk
beings outside Earth. Kant did something similar attempting to find a truth
imposes itself on the rationality of any potential finite rational being. Witl
só much effort, in our own world we find differences everywhere, só thai
possible to find real human beings with damage in their perceptive or me
faculties. However, rationality doesn't seem to be able to be otherwise. Hu]
rationality, like other aspects of the human mind (such as language, subje<
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experiences, etc.), is a blend of computational constraints and evolutionary
situations.
Computer scientist Marvin Minsky13 also questioned a few years ago the
possibility to communicate with hypothetical alien rational beings; his attempt
being just an enquiry about the ultimate nature of rationality in the correct context
of evolution. He concluded that the possibility of variation of the most basic
structures of rationality is very narrow. Ali possible rational beings could be
considered just «problem solvers». From this point of view «ali problem-solvers,
intelligent or not, are subject to the same ultimate constraints - limitation on
space, time and materiais». Coping with these constraints implies representations
and a way to manipulate them. Evolution would find necessarily certain common
ways because there are no easier ways available. Main ingredients of intelligence,
also for hypothetical aliens, would be: objectives, goals, cause-symbols, memories,
economics, planning, self-reference, self-awareness and just a few others.
'To evolve' means to search possible structures inside a universe, with the
principies of economics, sparseness and computation. These principies have
something to do with the computational constraints that are common to nature
and thought. Rationality is not, therefore, an evolutionary accident. The
enormously big number of random events that produce each evolutionary step
occur only in the small details because the overall logic of evolution imposes
itself on ali processes.
Some problems with Misky's argument are: 1. The human brain is assumed
to be a universal Turing machine, and some processes (such as creativity) cannot
be described in those terms. 2. It hás also been assumed that ali parts of reality
organize themselves with computational processes, and there are big doubts
concerning the microphysical realm.
Despite these limitations, this argument is a powerful tool to understand the
most difficult aspect of rationality: its amazing ability to truly represent nature.
Reason reaches beyond the strict subjectivity and seems to have a structure
homologous to the computational structure of our world. Prof. Curado finished
this line of thought with an observation followed by a question: Curiously we
tend to distrust almost ali instances of our person (feelings, perceptions...), why
should we trust our own reason?
A conjecture
To conclude his presentation Prof. Curado proposed the following conjecture,
as a literary or philosophical suggestion (because there is no way to prove it):
l. Human rationality hás a structure homologous to the computational structure
of reality (in reference to the characteristics of rationality already mentioned
above and the concepts of Darwin evolution). 2. It seems to be unfinished, because
13 MINSKY, MARVIN, «Why intelligent aliens will be intelligible», in REGIS, EDWARD, JR. (ed.),
Extraterrestrials: Science and Alien Intelligence (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985)'
pp. 117-128.
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it offers both true statements about reality and a cohort of paradoxes and
constitutive problems. 3. It emerged in the precise evolutionary sequence that
constituted our universe, being part of it (because this universe can be explained
using rational natural laws). 4. If our world were part of a multiverse (Max
Tegmark), where ali conceivable possibilities exist, then our rationality would
be just a regional characteristic of an evolutionary sequence (thus explaining its
apparent imperfections); many other types of rationality could exist in the other
uni verses of the multiverse.
First answers
CHRISTINE HELLER, how crucial is natural language for rationality?
CHRISTINE HELLER: Concerning the possibility of each person in the world having a
different language, she mentioned that in earlier sessions natural language had been
considered as something very close to reason, especially their metalanguage. She asked
then, how crucial natural language itself is for the type of rationality we seek to explain.
MANUEL CURADO affirmed that language is a powerful tool to understand the world
around us. But he wanted to highlight the sheer impossibility of dealing with a perfect
language (with enormous vocabulary, grammar, rules...). One could imagine other beings
having other resources, being perhaps able to manage and translate languages with
billions of terms, but this would be impossible for us. Só, it's important that our languages
have many possibilities but not too many, that we have many languages but not só many
that it would be impossible to communicate. The point is that our natural languages are
powerful but incomplete tools, as everything else in our lives (including rationality).
IGNACIO NÚNEZ DE CASTRO, we must use our rationality to explain rationality.
IGNACIO NÚNEZ DE CASTRO asked if it is at ali possible to explain what rationality is.
Because in order to explain it we have to use as tool precisely our own rationality.
MANUEL CURADO admitted that this situation makes it very tough, as it's a bad logical
option to explain rationality with rationality itself. But we can make a detour, and find
monotony, the same structures, the same computational constraints happening in many
aspects of the world (as the problem of translation or in economics). We can make a big
list of structures with computational constraints. Of course we are able to do it because
of our rationality.
JAVIER MONSERRAT, are computer models appropriate to understand our world?
JAVIER MONSERRAT said that in principie we can distinguish between natural objects,
such as rocks or human beings, and artificial objects, such as computers. But it is a fact
that cognitive sciences consider computers as a model to understand living beings, and
the human brain, for example. He asked the speaker whether he thought that this computer
model is appropriate to understand the physical world or not.
MANUEL CURADO mentioned Stephen Wolfram's book A new kind ofscience, where the
author defends that with cellular automata we can describe natural processes, objects
and everything around us, even physical laws. But he stated that from a philosophical
point of view this is impossible: computers, automata etc can be used as powerful models
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but are very insufficient to understand reality itself. However, computation hás no limits;
we haven't discovered yet the end point, the threshold of computation; amazing
computational models are still being discovered, such as the recent research on quantum
computing. Of course, that kind of model is not enough to describe the amazing variety
of biological beings, the beautiful universe around us. But our goal is not to just make
models, philosophical or mathematical models, we are doing something else: the
cartography, the most perfect map of reality. Our world hás a computational geography;
we can interpret Darwinian evolution and most parts of biology, chemistry, the world of
galaxies... as a sequence. We can diagnose this common pattern, the sequence of everything,
which is very complex. As it happens in ali aspects of our lives we find it is very improbable
to find this degree of complexity from the beginning, from the first step of anything. We
find the complexity only after many steps. What we are looking for is a description, a
cartography of our world.
III. DEBATE WITH MANUEL CURADO
Javier Monserrat, acting as moderator, first thanked Manuel Curado for his
presentation and valuable contribution to the Sophia-Iberia Academic Seminar.
He offered then a reflection linking both previous two sessions and addressing
at the end a few ideas from Curado's earlier talk. He hás since developed ali these
ideas in a thorough contribution that can be read below. After his thoughtful
participation the moderator opened the floor for questions from the audience.
JAVIER LEACH (Computer Sciences, U.C. Madrid): Evolution ofhuman reason is shown
in evolution on mathematics and computers.
JAVIER LEACH commented about evolution of human reason in relation to the evolution
of Mathematics. First step: when mathematicians had not enough producing algorithms
but wanted a proof of these algorithms, and that was firstly achieved (more or less) by
the Greeks (Egyptians knew important theorems but could not prove them). This step
shows a strong rationality, the ability to proof that an algorithm is correct. A second
important step carne at the end of the 19th century, and that is the complete formalization
of the language (although Aristotle had already begun to formalize the language). It
permits to speak rationally about the language, using Meta-mathematics. This process
of formalization hás been very strong during the 20th century. But today we can do that
with computers in three minutes. This is an historical milestone, humanity hás achieved
this complementarity of computing (formalism) and evolution. What we have achieved,
we can then transmit through the computers.
MANUEL CURADO said we are completely unable to prove that this is not just a coincidence.
Is development of mathematics really relevant for our understanding of the ultimate
nature of rationality? How can we prove that the structure of rationality in ourselves is
more than a beautiful set of skill and tools and does meet the structure of the universe
out there? We are utterly unable to prove this point. The historical development of
mathematics is impressive, but maybe other peoples on this Earth have different
mathematical histories. A few years ago Brasilian Logician Newton da Costa published
a paper entitled Is there a Zande logic? The Zande, a people from África, are supposedly
PENSAMIENTO, vol. 66 (2010), num. 249pp.511-543
M. CURADO, THE INTEREST OF REASON IN A WORLD IN EVOLUTION
able to keep contradictions in their own minds. Is it possible that other peoples on tt
Earth can have a completely different structure of rationality, one that encompass
contradictions, that accepts paradoxes? It seems interesting but in our world it is impossit
to have a different logical structure. History of mathematics is relevant, perhaps the ma
chapter of history of science, alongside physics. But, is it possible to prove that ti
mathematical structure of our rationality matches the enigmatic universe out there. T]
big problem is whether we have the ability to prove that there is a match between o
logic and the deep structure of physical reality.
ALFREDO DINIS (Philosophy, U.C. Portugal): Rationality, emotions and natural selectio
ALFREDO DINIS commented first about the relation between rationality and natur
selection. That natural selection occurs for adaptive reasons, giving the organis
advantages for survival, hás recently been doubted and debated. The question is if reasc
is a result of natural selection or not. And if reason is not the result of natural selectio
then of what?
Then he commented about systemics and holistic analysis, bringing to attention ti
concept «extended mind», the idea that mind is not ali inside our brains. But then wh
are the consequences of this view of extended mind for rationality, because it exteni
beyond our brains to the outside, for instance to a notebook? Memories being kept on
paper is not the same as in the brain. Now, does it mean that reason and rationality st<
beyond human mind?
Another comment concerned the dualistic view of human beings, having both emotio
and reason. There is some inner debate between emotions and reason. And emotions a
often considered to have their own reasons. But then, would it be better to have on
rationality and no emotions? If reason was selected by natural selection, as an advanta.
for survival of mankind, how is it then that mankind's rationality is constructing nucle
weapons, something that could have the effect of erasing ali advantages of mankind?
MANUEL CURADO appreciated the depth of Prof. Dinis' questions and began commentii
on the shortcomings of rationality. The question is 'can we prove how rationality emergi
in an evolutionary world?' Paying close attention to the shortcomings, handicaps, fau.
and impotence of reason, we see they are constitutive of reason itself. Evolutiona
psychologists have recently shown that our rationality is especially good when dealii
with social situations, and especially in problematic situations. If our rationality is indd
biased by social contents, then the structure of our reason is not a perfect structure. V
have a frailty that depends on evolution, that hás emerged in a peculiar situation in t
past of evolution. Not only in relation with social contents, but also concerning paradoxo
warfare, the consequences of our actions... we must play close attention to the
shortcomings of rationality. They are the path of analysis for us to understand how
emerged in evolution.
Concerning the 'extended mind', he explained that it is a very strong idea coming
modern times from Andy Clark and David Chalmers and also from 19th century natural
Baldwin. The Baldwin's effect shows that not only what we do but the very furniture
reality, the set of objects we deal with in a daily basis do have a 'ratio', an intrinsic log
It is very plausible that a part of our mind hás a connection with our world. We can lal
this an 'extended mind'. Human mind hás many structures: perceptive structures, wi
imagination, emotions, political bias, religious beliefs and many more. Most of t
structures do reflect our own interests, our communities, the history of our societies, o
intellectual traditions... But there is an exception, rationality describes not only an inn<
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subjective reality but also most enigmatically what is out there, and it seerns to match,
what is very enigmatic. Not just the subjective things, such as our preferences in taste,
which only reflects an inner world, a subjective experience... but a rational statement
about reality is not subjective in that sense. We could say it reflects an extended rnind, a
special part, a block of human mind that connects itself with the outer world.
About the emotions and their intromission in our rational life, in Curado's opinion
it's a never-ending story. Emotions seem to be a way to determine the agents' decisions.
They see theoretically ali possibilities but their feelings are the ones helping thern
make their decisions. Prof. Curado pondered the possibility that machines may be built
in the future which can help determine actions with devices other than emotional
devices.
Ivo CHELO (Research for Evolutionary Genetics, Portugal): Rationality's shortcomings
as proofofits evolutionary origin?
Ivo CHELO pointed out that rationality's shortcomings seem not to be a good sign of
adaptation. But because of the complex adaptation process itself, reason could have
evolved through adaptation and then various causes may have caused the shortcomings.
MANUEL CURADO clarified that rationality's shortcomings are for him rather a precious
hint, a proof that rationality hás been indeed selected by evolution. Evolution would have
selected precisely this structure of human mind, with its complete set of shortcomings.
This list of shortcomings is precious for us, for our enquiry to understand the enigma of
rationality. In the 18* century rationality was considered a perfect structure, but already
at the end of 19th century everybody began to doubt this perfection of rationality, as seen
with the problems in Mathematics. A philosophical technique is to imagine possible
counterfactual scenarios, where we can imagine beings with a perfect rationality, much
better than our own rationality (though in his opinion that kind of beings does not exist
anywhere else).
IGNACIO NÚNEZ DE CASTRO (Biochemistry and Natural Philosophy, Spain): Influence
ofAugustinus or Averroes' conceptions?
IGNACIO NÚNEZ DE CASTRO commented about Monserrat's assertion that transition from
concrete to abstract is rationality's main characteristic. This conception seems proper of
Augustinus and his idea of illumination, and seems also close to Averroes' conception of
intellectus agens. Is the concept of emergence an inversion of the scholastic concept of
intellectus agens?
JAVIER MONSERRAT clarified that what he said earlier had no relationship with Augustinus
nor the scholastic. He was speaking of the process of evolution, stating that probably
reason hás emerged evolutionary as a process of automatic system analysis within the
concrete situation of living beings. In the course of this evolution, one stage after the
other, system strategies would have emerged in animais. This could be explained in terms
of the epistemology and logic of Peirce or even Zubiri. This system analysis in animais
is very concrete and human reason could be the superior stage of this system analysis.
AU this was said in relation to the ideas debated during the first two sessions of the
seminar. Where it was also discussed that this conception should be completed with the
idea that human reason is also the result of a holistic experience.
IGNACIO NÚNEZ DE CASTRO pointed out that Augustinus explained the holistic experience
by illumination.
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JAVIER MONSERRAT replied that today science is thinking these questions in a differen
framework, só that this holistic experience might perhaps be explained in a completei
naturalistic way. In fact, the holistic experience of the world makes it easier to admit th
possibility of the existence of God, but it can never be a proof of God's existence. We cai
accept ali this quantum coherence, superposition, etc. and give a new holistic vision c
the world, trying to attain a naturalistic explanation of it.
JAVIER LEACH: Different leveis of the holistic experience.
JAVIER LEACH explained that there are different leveis for the holistic experience. Th
entanglement (presented by Walach in our second session) is a very complete experienc
that cannot be explained mathematically, só that two complementary theories are neede
in order to explain it. It needs to be objectified with two different mathematical theorie
(like waves and particles). But in his opinion there is a different levei of holistic experience
the metaphysical experience. When you experience reality as a totality, the question i
why something does at ali exist; that is the metaphysical question.
MANUEL CURADO admitted that this was a very profound issue, and it was hard to ad
anything to it. He just wanted to share that a few years ago he tried to analyze a beautifi
text that described those kinds of experiences from a naturalistic point of view, writte
in is our common natural language, for instance the eschatological myth of Plato, whic
describes holistic experiences of death, the afterlife or the very essence of the universi
In this analysis he found out some logical principies that seemed to be a violation of th
usual ones, but also seemed to be somehow the same.
SEAN WINKLER (Loyola Marymount University, United States): Exploring the possibilii
to obey or disobey natural structures.
SEAN WINKLER commented his interest in the subject of there being different structurt
in nature and the possibility to obey or disobey them. We can assume that som
contradictions in logic might be possible (as the African people who have the ability 1
sustain contradictory thoughts at the same time), but we also understand that sorr
structures in nature do need consistency in order to stand the test of time. He asked f c
some possible counterfactual scenario where these possibilities could be explored.
MANUEL CURADO stated that to think a scenario where physical laws are violated ca
only be done in an imaginative exercise.
CHRISTINE HELLER (Electrical Engineer, U.P. Comillas, Madrid): Where does our net
for consistency come from?
CHRISTINE HELLER commented about our strong need to defend logical consistenc
mainly because of the training we have received. She remembered how in our seminal
last session a young female engineer stated vigorously during the debate th
inconsistencies are not possible, and wanted to bring into consideration if this need com
from our type of rationality, our models, our language or perhaps our emotions. Ar
talking about emotions, she also wanted to mention the case of robots that are beii
made to interact apparently in an emotional way and the kind of reality that is implii
in this task and that is só hard to grasp in our scientific models.
MANUEL CURADO pointed out that many variations of rationality may materialize
different structures (as for instance, language, with the example of the Zande ability
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sustain different opinions about the same topic at the same time), but for the basic
structure of our rationality it is impossible to be otherwise. He finds it impossible to
imagine a human being (toddler, young person or an adult full of wisdom) trying to make
the right choices without the basic structure of rationality. We can take into account ali
kinds of minor variations, as different feelings, opinions, religious beliefs, political parties,
but there is something in common that we can't even imagine to be able to leave out: the
very essence of rationality, the obedience to logical principies, the respect for the overall
coherence of reality. The human rational structure hás handicaps and intrinsic problems....
but notwithstanding this, it survived in a very demanding context, and this context is
evolution.
After this last question was answered, Javier Monserrat thanked everybody for their
attendance and participation and ended the session, but not before mentioning that a
summary of each session of the seminar is being prepared and the way to get them for
any interested person.
IV. JAVIER MONSERRATS CONTRIBUTION TO CURADO
PRESENTATION
Professor Manuel Curado's presentation at the meeting of Sophia-Iberia's
Academic Seminar in Braga is extremely suggestive. I understand that, ultimately,
he provides an evolutionary hypothesis that could explain the génesis of reason.
We are in agreement with this general hypothesis. But if we want to go deeper
(to reconstruct in detail the sequence of neurological, biological and physical
states of the evolutionary process leading to the emergence of reason), obviously,
we must risk more precise conjectures. We will try to comment the ideas presented
by Curado; comments that are likely to be extended in order to consider their
consequences in the overall logic of the Seminar.
Curado begins affirming that rationality hás emerged in an evolutionary
world. This fact appears to be a contradiction 1) because evolution is always a
causal, probabilistic and statistic process, 2) even though rationality seems to
have a claim of absolute security in providing statements about objects and
processes in the world. We would say that evolution is insecure and open, but
rationality is secure, closed on knowledge of absolute truth. This contrast is
pointed out by Curado in a rhetoric manner, since, during the presentation, he
explains why this contradiction does not really exist: because reason is not
absolute, but an evolutionary open process. Therefore reason must be understood
in the context of evolution. The contradiction raised by Curado in the beginning
of his presentation is only rhetorical because rationality at the end will not be
understood as it was initially presented. Reason is, in fact, a product of evolution:
it is a fact that occurred in evolution and it is subject to natural constraints and
frailties of the evolutionary process. If this is really the thesis of Curado (and we
think só), we do agree with it.
Therefore, in order to review and comment the thesis of Curado it is desirable
in our view to start at the end of his presentation. It is explaining Minsky's thought
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where he assumes his evolutionary approach to understanding the emergence
of reason.
l. MlNSKY AND THE EVOLUTIONARY NATURE OF REASON
Curado said that Minsky places rationality in the right context, the evolutionary
nature. Minsky's question about the possibility of intercommunication with aliens
is, in essence, a question about human rationality. Minsky argues that this
communication would be based on the fact that the possible variations of rationality
in the universe are very limited. Human beings, biological beings and possible
extraterrestrial beings would be limited by the same «computacional constraints».
Curado means that this position brings together two arguments of great
philosophical importance: theory of evolution and computational constructions.
Every being, living or non living, can be understood (according to Minsky) as «a
general problem solver» that hás to adapt to the same natural constraints: Hence
ways should be devised to represent these situations and processes and at the same
time to manipulate these representations. Curado, só far, according to Minsky,
introduces an important expression (also used throughout his presentation):
«Computational constraints» attributed to the world (the world is the agent that
enforces these computational constraints). This would deserve a first comment.
Computational constraints. In scientific language a computer is an engineering
tool built by humans to process information, according to certain rules of
operation. These computers can respond today to a serial or connectionist
engineering PDP (parallel distributing processing). Minsky rejected, since his
criticism of the first perceptron designed by Frank Rosenblatt, the connectionist
engineering feasibility. Therefore the universal Turing machine is then the basis
of serial computers that respond to Minsky's thought. Accordingly, a serial
computer is an instrument that records information to process it by implemented
algorithmic programs. These consist of a serial sequence of operations processed
in one CPU, when applied to a previous database. It is mus very difficult to argue
that the universe as a whole might be a serial computer. But what science really
tells us is only this: that the ontology of matter produces evolutionary processes
that are manifested in laws and physical structures of the real world. Physical
events in the universe are not «serial computations», but real «interactions within
matter according to its own laws». These laws produce by themselves a sequence
of interactions, similar to an algorithm, but are not themselves a designed
algorithm (at least science cannot think só). Therefore, given the deterministic
character (at least in part) of material interactions in the history of the universe,
it is possible to computationally simulate the génesis of the universe and its
processes. The universe, therefore, can be simulated, more o less with an
approximate accuracy, on a computer (for the scientist who knows the laws of
natural processes), but the universe is not itself a computer. In our view, it seems
not to be wise to use Minsky's expression speaking of «computational constraints»
either of evolution or of reason. We should better speak of «natural constraints».
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Notwithstanding, scientists who know these «natural constraints» can design
serial computing programs which will be subjected to these «natural constraints»,
to design their algorithmic processing sequences.
Deterministic natural constraints and génesis ofreason. Since the big bang
occurred, the macroscopic universe responds to a deterministic system (at least
in part). It would be the deterministic universe that was dreamt up by Einstein,
still in the conceptual paradigm of classical mechanics. According to the above
discussion, a serial computer (built by the hurnan mind) would be more or less
accurate in their simulation of a universe with «natural deterministic constraints».
But it is not just the case that scientists could translate the «natural deterministic
constraints» in «computational constraints». It is something more important. The
human mind (reason) hás evolutionarily designed its operation rules to represent
a universe which is made objectively by these «natural deterministic constraints».
These rules - logical and cognitive - have shaped in part the human mind. Classical
mechanics hás described the macroscopic deterministic world, which we have
referred to in previous sessions of the seminar. Life is a system and anticipates
the future through systems analysis and synthesis (Poli, First Session).
Curado notes that reason stems from the objective structures of the world. «The
very core of this argument is the notion that the emergence of rational structures
was inevitable. 'To evolve' means in this context to search inside a universe of
possible structures». And further: «Precisely reason seems to have a structure
amazingly homologous to the computational structure of our world, it's possible
that human reason hás an interest of its own». Alluding to the title of Curado's
presentation, we understand that there is a real «Interest of Reason in the World
in Evolution». Reason is, só we think, a life instrument of adaptation to the
constraints of a real objective world. Reason is evolutionarily designed (at least in
part) to represent an objective world of deterministic systems and structures (a
mechano-classical world). This is a natural survival interest in an evolving world.
However, in our view, limiting our experience of the world to these
«deterministic natural constraints» (which Curado, according to Minsky, call
computational constraints) and limiting our representation of that world to
deterministic systems and structures (believing the world is well simulated by
computer models) would be a «constraint» in our mind that would be inconsistent
with the objective evidence of living beings. This «constraint» hás been called
«reductionism» in the history of thought. Thus, reductionism hás tried to «reduce»
the explanation of ali reality to the deterministic classical mechanics. This hás
led to great dissatisfaction among many scientists and philosophers because the
world, though really deterministic in part, is not an «absolute deterministic
prison» where living things (and people) are enclosed (absolutely determinated).
2. BEYOND MINSKY'S «COMPUTATIONAL CONSTRAINTS»
It seems inevitable to accept that the configuration of reason hás an
evolutionary origin and therefore it is a posteriori. The only «constraint» should
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be the natural ontology of matter generated through the very primordial event
of the universe in the big bang. Matter that hás produced through time, as a
consequence of its own ontology, the states and the current organization of the
universe that science describes. Therefore the point of science is that the ontology
of matter hás not only been able to produce blind interaction between mechanical
and deterministic systems (and the appearance of blind robotic systems, puré
cybernetics, with mechanical self-control and anticipation of the future). It was
also able to produce the emergence of sensation, perception, consciousness and
what we call a «psychic subject» in both the animal and human beings. Through
natural Mind - that of Minsky, or of any other human being - a «psychic subject»
(human) leads representative processes of the world which respond to the
«interests of life».
We think, therefore, that the mind is evolutionarily shaped to form
representations of the objective world. It hás therefore been shaped by its
experience of the «objective world» which always represents the fundamenta]
constraint. But the important thing is to realize that the mind hás not only had
experience of a world made of «deterministic natural constraints» (01
«computational constraints», according to Minsky), but also experience of a
world of sensations, perceptions and consciousness. The world in which the
«psychic subject» - which possesses a «mind» and produces representations ol
the world applied to optimal adaptation - is done in part by a mechano-classic
stable and deterministic system (the biological body), but also partly by a system
of indeterministic decisions and holistic sensations. Therefore, if reason is ar
instrument of adaptation to a real world experience, it is conceivable that reason's
shape (its functional logic and cognitive processes) will depend partly on the
experience of a (mechano-classic) world of difference, discontinuity and
determination. But it also will in part depend on the experience of a world ol
continuity, indetermination and holistic fields (see Second Session: Walach).
The challenges of the puré «computational constrains» of Minsky's
reductionism hás been observed by Curado in his presentation when he says:
«There are, of course, a few problems with this Minskys argument. The firs
one is, obviously, the conviction that the human brain is a universal Turin|
machine. Nobody is sure about this point, and it's possible that the mós
interesting rational processes, like creativity in general and mathematica
creativity in particular, cannot be described according to the notion of Turin| machine. Another difficult point concerns the supposition that ali parts of realit?
organize themselves with computational processes. For instance, nobody is sun
about this point in what concerns the microphysical realms. (For the sake o
the argument, we can emphasize that biological evolution happens on complexit<
leveis very different from the complexity levei of microphysics)».
I think the problems mentioned by Curado, in reference to Minsky'í
«computational constraints», have already been addressed during the Semina:
in the discussions of Roberto Poli, Gregor Nickel and Harald Walach. A) Th<
génesis of reason depends on the prior existence of a universe of structures anc
systems (generated since the big bang). Só life hás probably been produced b:
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evolution as a cybernetic system that interacts with the environment by physical-
chemical-biological mechanisms. A system that, according to Poli, might even
be able to cybernetically anticipate the future. B) But the génesis of human
reason (and also of animal knowledge) depends on an emergent property of the
ontology of matter: the sensitivity that by its evolutionary complexity ends in
the perception lead by a «psychic subject» with an integrated consciousness.
C) Therefore, living beings have «sensed» (perceived and made conscious) a real-
world of structures and systems where everything is rigorously deterministic.
As a result, this sensation modality hás led to some representative functions
(logical and cognitive) as an analysis of structures and systems that respond to
a mechano-classical objectivity (they have «represented» the world as a system
of elements and relations). This was addressed in the first session of the seminar.
D) However, the capacity to «sense» (perceive, to be conscious) presents not
only a real world of structures and systems (stable objects, discontinuous and
differentiated into a network of structures/systems), but also a world of no less
real indetermination, unitary fields and holistic sensation. E) It is then conceivable
that reason will also be configured to produce adequate representations of that
indeterministic and holistic world to get an optimal adaptation to it. Hence the
sense of Walach's proposal calling for a psychology based on a «principie of
complementarity», in the same way as modern physics hás also established a
«principie of complementarity».
3. CURADO'S CONJECTURE
Curado concluded his presentation with a conjecture: «111 end this talk with
a very imaginative conjecture. Let me state clearly that I've no way of proving
it. If you want só, feel free to interpret it as a literary or philosophical suggestion».
We also consider interesting to provide our commentary on these assumptions,
trying to be consistent with what we have previously stated.
Computational structure ofreality? The first conjecture is made by Curado
this way: «Human rationality hás a structure homologous to the computational
structure of reality; we can verify this with a few concepts derived from Physics
or from the Sciences of Complexity (namely, algorithmic compression, locality,
logical depth, and Turing machine), or with the biological concept of Darwinian
evolution». But I say, not only that. The right assumption must be that human
rationality is derived not only from adapting to a mechano-classical deterministic
world (although in part it is, and thus it is suitable to represent and simulate a
deterministic world). Our reason is produced also from adaptation to an
indeterministic world and to holistic experiences, as they are felt and perceived
by living beings (hence the human creativity, imagination, philosophy, art, poetry,
literature... and the ability to devise a quantum-mechanical physics). Human
rationality reflects not only the stable determination of the world (our biological
body), but the holistic indeterminacy is also reflected in one physical dimension
of the world, not less empirical than the other (our psychic experience.) Therefore
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we do not know: a) whether the classical mechanical world as a totality can be
simulated by computation (in part it can), b) whether the world of holistic
indeterminacy, the world of uncertainty which is reflected in the human mind
can be completely simulated by computers (in part it can).
Weakness of the products of reason. Curado's conjecture: «Human rationality
seems to be an unfmished building, because it offers us both true statements
about reality and a cohort of paradoxes and constitutive problems». The
conjecturai character of human knowledge, and of science, is a basic principie
of modern epistemology, at least since Popper's criticai rationalism. It is, let's
say, the basic conjecture of epistemology.
Evolutionary emergence of reason. Curado's third conjecture responds to the
evolutionary origin of reason in order to adapt to the real physical universe. «We
know that rationality emerged in a precise evolutionary sequence we call 'our
universe', and, as far as we can see, it's part of the whole observable universe
because this universe can be explained using rational natural laws». We completely
agree. Reason is possible because the universe hás been objectively made according
to natural rational Laws that, as we explained earlier, are produced by the ontology
of matter emerged in the Big Bang. Notwithstanding, we can't argue scientifically
that this kind of ontology should be necessarily the case.
Multiverse? Curado's fourth conjecture is certainly the stronger one. In reality,
it is an unnecessary conjecture to explain the origin and nature of rationality in
our universe. Curado seems to be attracted by the hypothesis of multiverses,
according to the version offered by Max Tegmark. «Taking notice of the physical
theories of the Swedish physicist Max Tegmark and other Many Worlds
Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics, it may happen that our world is not part
of a universe but part of a multiverse where ali conceivable possibilities are
indeed existing». «Many other types of rationality could exist in many other
universes of Tegmark's multiverse». Tegmark's theory is known as the «ultimate
ensemble theory of everything», whose only postulate is that «ali structures that
exist mathematically exist also physically». A theory of this nature cannot be
proven nor disproved. It cannot undergo any arguments that could show that it
is false. Therefore it is doubtfully scientific. It is puré speculation with no scientific
evidence. This is the case for other autor's theories of multiverses and for the
string theory itself, now under severe criticism (Lee Smolin). Are there an>
alternative rationalities? We think só, but not because there are multiverses, bui
because the rationality which só far hás described our objective physical worlc
could be incorrect or in need of new formal and scientific formulations.
4. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF RATIONALITY IN OUR UNIVERSE
Therefore, reason understood in this way (as a form of representatioi
constructed at an early stage in the animal mind, and finally, in the human mind
in order to perfectly adapt animais and men to the objective physical world s<
that they could survive) hás an evolutionary origin that explains its nature. I
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functions as a structural analysis of objective world in classical mechanics, but
also as representing an objective world of holistic indetermination. The four
initial features, explained by Curado in his presentation to understand the evolving
nature of reason, respond to this approach. We fully agree with thern, provided
they are understood in accordance with the observations we have stated. Curado
tells us of three properties of individual reason (creativity, locality and logical
depth) and of a fourth property we could call «intersubjective complexity».
Selective and biased rationality. For Curado it is clear that rationality is not a
reflection of the objective world (as intended by the positivistic «objectivism» in
the «mirror theory» of the early Wittgenstein). Popperian rationality hás a creative
sense, as the passive reflection of the world is impossible. «The special beings that
do own those structures - ourselves - do not duplicate the world. Rationality is
not a perfect mirror of nature. It's selective, biased and, obviously, is much more
simple than the whole of nature itself». Never comes to exhaust the depth of nature
presented to us through the experience of phenomena. This epistemological point
of view is a consequence of evolutionary theory of knowledge. Humans are not in
possession of the truth, but must build it rationally through a posteriori critic,
analysis and synthesis, of phenomena, being always open to rebuild these constructs.
The logic of Popperian rationality is always evolutive.
Locality. The evolutionary confíguration of the animal and human mind hás
always relied on their adaptation to an objective, immediate, local environment.
In this regard, as Curado rightly notes, rationality is always local. It could not
be otherwise, at least in its origin. «Saying this otherwise: human mind hás the
obvious property of locality. In order for us to know something, we don't need
to know everything in the universe. The way we know something is always local
and regional; one could also say, atomic». However, that rationality might be
local in origin, does not prejudice that it must be local in its final stages. The
laws of physics, for example, based on local analysis and synthesis, are a
generalization for the whole universe. This generalizing capability based on the
rational formalization hás also an evolutionary origin (see the discussions of the
Second Session). However, it is a hypothetical generalization, criticai and open
to constant reformulation in the history of knowledge.
Logical depth. In an evolutionary perspective, the premise to understand how
reason hás been formed and how rationality hás become more and more complex,
i.e. what its origin and its nature are, is the content of the objective world. As
Curado says: the logic depth of nature is driving the growing logical depth of
human rationality. «Let's state this without ambiguity: the structure of human
rationality is connected with the degree of complexity of the world itself. Using
a category that belongs to physics and the complexity sciences, one would say
that our world hás depth, logical depth, I mean, the world had to take many
steps to go from the beginning until the levei of organization we see around us.
If we consider the world as a computational system, this current levei of
organization would imply time, huge amounts of time, many steps in the between
and the progressive abandon of simpler leveis». However, what dimensions leaves
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open the logical depth of the world? Curado seems to point out again the
computational depth: «How can we explain the emergence of rationality in z
world in evolution? What must we precisely explain? These aspects seem to me
the most relevant: algorithmic compression, locality of our knowledge and the
degree of logical depth. Is this enough?» However we insist on our point of view
it is not only an understanding that could express algorithmic aspects of the
deterministic and mechano-classical world (the serial algorithmic programs carj
simulate in part the processes of nature), but it is also an understanding of our
indeterministic and holistic experience that cannot be done algorithmically.
Intersubjective rationality. Curado says that these three characteristics could
exist even if evolution hás allowed for the existence of a unique rational being
in some places in the universe. «Lefs add, then, a fourth property to the already
mentioned three. Ill name it as the multiplicity of rational beings. When we
mentioned algorithmic compression, locality and logical depth we were very
close to an anthropic perspective, I mean the universe hás unfolded itself in such
a way that it allowed the emergence of rational observers. On the contrary, the
multiplicity of rational beings shows us imperfection, impotence and
incompletitude. Rationality is not only the most beautiful collection of mankind's
highest achievements; it's also the problematic collection of permanent
underachievements and very humiliating ones». E very human being can build
their rationality from a certain locality. Therefore subjective rationality must be
confronted with the subjectivity of others, becoming intersubjective in society.
Science and rationality are an intersubjective social process. This difficult process
is commented by Curado in the framework of the só called «The button dilemma».
Intersubjectivity is also compatible with the final evolutionary perspective that
we and Curado defend.
5. CONCLUSION: THE NATURE OF REASON AS AN EVOLUTIONARY INTEREST
What is the origin and nature of reason? Curado's answer hás been elaborated
from an evolutionary framework: Reason hás occurred in the evolution and it
is its evolutionary origin that explains its functional characteristics. Reason
reflects the nature of a living being who must survive by adapting to the objective
environment. Reason is an instrument for survival in living organisms by
producing representations that install them in the real world. The title of Curado's
presentation reflects his fundamental evolutionary approach: the Interest of
Reason in a World of Evolution. The interest of reason is adaptive and occurs
as a result of an evolutionary adaptation process of living things with sensitivity-
consciousness to an objective reality.
However, we believe that adaptation involves not only adapting to a mechano-
classical world that gives rise to a deterministic world that may be reflected in
computational constraints constructed by human mind. The living being not only
feels a mechano-classical world (where certain leveis of computable determination
are real), but also feels an holistic indeterministic world (actually unified physical
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fields) to which it must also be adapted. Therefore, reason probably reflects not
only how to represent a world of deterministic structures and systems (Poli, First
Session), but also how to represent an indeterministic and holistic world (Walach,
Second Session). Reason hás a long tradition of creating a deterministic science
(mechano-classical). But it's only beginning to build a scientific representation of
a no less real indeterministic and holistic world, which hás always been expressed
in ordinary knowledge, poetry or art. The evolution of reason through the
epistemological characteristics studied by Curado (selective and biased rationality,
locality, logical depht, intersubjective rationality), not only should be applied to
the representation of «computational constraints of the world» (Minsky), but to
a reason that constructs representations to adapt to an indeterministic and holistic
world of actual experience of living beings (Walach).
V. PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS OF SESSION III
Projecting the ideas presented by Curado in this session on the logical thread
of the Seminar some basic statements become highlighted. The logical thread
responds to a fundamental orientation: what is the origin and nature of reason?
The course of the Seminar allows us to establish a set of clues to answer this
question.
1) The fundamental reference point to explain where reason comes from is
the existence of an objective world, built in a certain way. Living beings
must adapt to it according to the way they «feel» it through the sensory
system. Therefore reason is an evolutionary adaptation tool that is
configured to «represent» the objective world and perform an action-
oriented best adaptive knowledge.
2) Reason finds by experience a deterministic world (classical mechanics)
built in the form of systems and structures (Poli) which are a set of
«computational constraints» (Curado). This results in a certain way of
knowing the world that hás been expressed in formal systems of classical
mathematics and in the traditional image of the physical world.
3) However, Walach's contribution leaves the door open to understand that
reason hás also been produced by the experience of an indetermistic and
holistic world. This type of reasoning is shown in ordinary knowledge,
poetry and art, for example. But it is clear that science hás not yet found
the way to describe this strange world. Quantum mechanics, as discussed
in the Second Session, would be the scientific framework that só far hás
described the microphysical indeterministic and holistic world. Curado
does not develop this quantum world open by Walach but he is not closed
to the admission of its possible importance, as explained above.
4) Formal systems are a fact that hás been noted by Curado. But we do not
know why mathematics coincides with the real physical world. We are
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open to the possibility that our reason could build alternatives to the
formal systems that exist today. Science hás built formal systems to
describe the classical world that have been proved highly effective. But
science could imagine new formalization systems to describe the quantum
mechanical world. Ali this is open. Curado, in accordance to his
evolutionary approach, insists on the freedom of reason in the imagination
of its formal worlds, as Gregor Nickel hás also pointed out from his own
point of view.
In conclusion, reason hás been configured in the evolutionary process as a
means of survival in an objective world. A deterministic objective world of systems
and structures hás imposed settings of a certain aspect of reason. But an
indeterministic and holistic world hás also left its mark on the ordinary human
reason and hás produced in science the quantum mechanical image of the world.
In its representation of the world, and its formal systems used to describe it,
natural reason is weak, full of shortcomings that can be explained precisely
because reason is built step by step through evolutionary adaptation. Therefore
the evolutionary origin explains the nature of reason.
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